An 18 hole playoff that ended up a tie. And then a sudden death playoff that resulted in yet another "major" tournament win for Tiger. And yet there was a cost for that effort, no golf for the remainder of the season. You can't quantify the level of excitement that surrounded this tournament, it was spectacular, riveting, I could not tear myself away. But again, what was the cost to Tiger? He places so much importance on "major" tournaments as a measure of greatness. Was this an acceptable risk, or might this be characterized as a Pyrric victory?
I would ask, do we make more realistic demands on ourselves and the units we lead while operationally deployed, compared to how we trained in the peacetime Army? Continuous operations places strenuous demands on everyone, leadership especially. What adjustments have you seen that led to effective long term unit effectiveness? Or do we persist in what we learned in training?
Always interested in your observations and experiences. Sharing them provides an effective method of education and often can lead to learning without having to repeat mistakes. Hank
After the battle, Pyrrus, the leader who would not stop fighting, said, "One more such victory, and I am lost."
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This posting effectively reminds all of us, or at least those of us who play golf, that our immediate decisions have lasting consequences.
It reminded me of Kenny Perry's choice. Until just before the US Open Perry, a 45-year old journeyman, had not qualified. He nonetheless declined to play in the US Open because he had previously committed to play that weekend in the John Deere Classic, a notably less prestigious event. Perry's secondary motive for skipping the Open was to attempt to accumulate more points for golf's FEDEX Cup and ensure his place on the Ryder Cup Team. The John Deere provided a less competitive environment, and Perry won the tournament. While Tiger sits home, Perry leads the FEDEX cup race and has locked up a place in the Ryder Cup.
Woods and Perry's contrasting golf strategies are mirrored in recent national security debates. Should we focus on the "long war" against terrorism, stability operations, and counterinsurgency, or future large-scale conventional conflict? Defense Secretary Gates recently criticized those who would focus on major war, which is more dangerous but less likely, while neglecting counterinsurgency, which poses a less serious threat to our security but is a much more likely prospect given the contemporary environment. There is no answer to this dilemma. The military must fight and win the nation's wars, but the future we envision has second and third order effects in how we man, equip, and train our forces today. If we think the future looks like Somalia or Afghanistan, then we won't buy the tanks and sophisticated aircraft needed to fight a major ground war against a powerful competitor. What's your call? What future do you envision?
Tom,
Always good to hear another golfing story. It is refreshing to hear Kenny Perry following through on a previous plan. It was tempting I'm sure to play the US Open, but it appears he considered that and opted instead to solidify a Ryder Cup spot instead.
With respect to the national security debate, let it continue, let it be open to all viewpoints, and let all contributors forward their best, unemotional and reasoned positions. Our leaders deserve the best advice possible to help them decide the way ahead.
When the Crusader program was shelved a few years back there was a good bit of anguish in the field artillery community. It was on track to becoming a tremendous system. But even though it did not go into production the technical development could continue. Depending on a number of factors it may actually become conceptually obsolete as it is succeeded by more capable or cost-efficient systems.
In the meantime the Paladin system continues to provide a tremendous fire support capability. For the environment we operate in today I would contend that it is enough capability for now, and at a fraction of the cost for Crusader.
On the one hand the environment we find ourselves operating in today places a particular set of demands on our military. But it is my assessment that we need to keep our options open. History has demonstrated over and over again that we can't count on this persisting to the exclusion of another major war.
For years we trained in a particular manner at the training centers. The approach paid off, but one could argue that the focus was too much on high intensity operations. In the aftermath of our current fights it would be a mistake if we don't achieve a more balanced full spectrum training approach.
In the meantime, it is your generation of field grades that will shape the way ahead. You will labor at the right-hand side of the decision-makers. You will work thankless hours to study problems that seemingly have no solutions. And yet you will help to unravel the complexity to help our Army leadership understand how to decide.
What gives me faith in the future is that we've agreed to single track our functional area officers so that we have expertise that was unimaginable only ten years ago.
But that is another discussion. Thanks for a thoughtful post, it has enough substance so that we could have actively discussed it for 3 1/2 months and not get bored.
Reflecting back on my experience last year as a Brigade MiTT operations officer, I still have a 50/50 take on the experience. In a lot of ways it was one of the most rewarding things I have done in the military, while on the other hand it was one of the most frustrating times have been through. Working directly with the Afghan National Army is an experience all by itself. You go through days that make you wonder if they will ever get past buddy team bounding, and the very next day they can execute a near flawless Brigade level attack (logistics not included). The part of the process that completely frustrates me the most is the Army side of how we staff and train the MiTTs. There has to be a better way of doing business within the most advance military in the world, right!?!
My MiTT tour was my second Afghanistan tour. I was lucky enough to get a ticket in the 101st ABN DIV to deploy during the initial campaigns for both Afghanistan and Iraq. When the Army notified me that I was supposed to deploy to the Sinai two weeks before the Israeli conflict in 2006 broke out, I was sitting on about 212 PERSTEMPO days for 2004, 198 days for 2005, and approaching 180 for 2006. Then the Army went to “dwell time”, which doesn’t count TDY as time away from home. I was a little amazed, and pissed, because I new guys in my unit that had no tours anywhere. How did I get picked (yeah, yeah, woe is me!)? I made a call to the branch manager and asked to not be sent and he nonchalantly agreed. I thought the process was over, until the result of the CFD boards were release and I was set to move to Strategic Intelligence and go to school for a year to get a Masters of Science in Strategic Intelligence. One week later, the branch manager dropped me an e-mail assigning me to the MiTT, Afghanistan. I fought, but there was no getting out of it. I was sure it was done out of pure spite because of my choice to CFD. Everyone in the infantry knows how these things go, or as we sometimes say, “better you than me.”
In October of 2006 I found myself at Ft. Riley, in 25 degree weather and snow wondering how training here could replicate the desert environment where I was going. Environment aside, I have to say that was the worst training I have ever seen in the Army (except their CLS) and the entire 3 months was a complete waste of life. There was so little of value in their training that I could glean, I spent most days making up something else for my team do. The trainers were the guys that got left behind at Ft. Riley when the surge was going into effect. Do you see where this is going? The entire class was thoroughly so disgusted with training that we had a open session the CG in theater during in processing, which prompted him to send a team back to do an investigation in the training practices at Ft. Riley.
The training was just the beginning. My team was a mix of MOS’s but more importantly consisted of only two volunteers out of 14. One was my team leader and the other was a 10 year retiree who wanted to get his retirement pay set to the current pay scale, so he came back in as way of doing so. I, have a general opinion that MiTT leaders are LTC’s who didn’t get command and felt cheated, however, there is reason they didn’t get selected and shouldn’t allowed to correct the deficiency by assuming command of a squad. What a miserable year lay in store for me, the S-3.
At any rate, I survived the year, and was able to do a lot good in Helmand Province. My experiences in country were worth 10 years of training and I am sure will carry over throughout the rest of my career and with any luck, in Shah Allah, it will be the last.
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